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Abstract
We consider two straightforward rules that govern the stochastic choice
in a single quantum mechanical event. They are shown to lead to absurd
results if an “objective” state reduction is allowed to compete with an “ob-
server” state reduction. Since the latter collapse is empirically verifiable,
the existence of the former is thrown into question.
Introduction
Let a particle and detector interact. The state of the system prior to interaction
is given by
Φ(t) = exp(−iHt)ψiDi
where ψi is the initial state of the particle, and Di is the initial state of the
detector. After interaction at time t0, the particle and detector will become
entangled and evolve into two decoherent components
Φ(t ≥ t0) = ψ(t)D0 +D1(t) (1)
where the first is the partially scattered particle together with the detector in
its ground state, and the second is the detector in its excited or capture state.
The second component is zero at t0.
In the following reducto ad absurdum argument, I first assume that eq. 1
may stochastically reduce to either ψ(t)D0 or D1 without the benefit of an
observer. I will then show that the result is not supportable when an observer
is added to the mix.
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The Rules
I do not propose a theory of collapse. The rules given below describe the col-
lapse of a wave function in a way that is independent of theory. They define the
circumstances that trigger a collapse, they specify the timing consistent with ob-
servation and Hamiltonian dynamics, and they do so without having to provide
a separate theoretical structure. A collapse refers here to an individual event,
not an ensemble of events. So D1 is the sole surviving state in one collapse, and
ψ(t)D0 is the survivor in another. Potentially, each of these collapses follows its
own rule. The first rule (A) governs a collapse to the state D1, and the second
rule (B) governs a collapse to the state ψ(t)D0.
Rule (A): The probability current J flowing from the first to the second com-
ponent in eq. 1 gives the probability per unit time that there will be a stochastic
choice of state D1, causing a collapse of the superposition to D1.
The probability current J is equal to the time rate of change of the square
modulus. It is the rate at which the first component decreases and the second
component increases due to current flow from the first to the second.
The total probability of a collapse to D1 is equal to an integral of J from the
beginning of the interaction to the end. That amount will depend on the cross
section of the interaction and the length of time that the detector is exposed
to the oncoming particle. This means that the collapse (corresponding to a
particle capture) can occur at any time during the interaction, where both the
time of the collapse and the total probability of its happening are determined
by the probability current. So whatever theory of collapse one might entertain,
it must make use of the magnitude and duration of this current. Otherwise, the
theory will conflict with Hamiltonian dynamics.1,2
Now consider rule (B) that governs a collapse to ψ(t)D0 when there is no
capture in an individual event. This one is difficult. The trouble is that it makes
no sense to declare ‘no-capture’ while the interaction is still in progress. Doing so
would abort rule (A). There is no moment of time during the interaction when a
1To simplify matters I assume that a collapse, once begun, is instantaneous. The following
argument does not critically depend on that assumption.
2One thing is certain. A theory is wrong that requires an (almost) immediate state re-
duction because of the macroscopic nature of the detector; for surely the size of the detector
has nothing to do with the current flowing into it. Circumstances might make the current
flow in eq. 1 indefinitely small; in which case, the macroscopic superposition might last for an
indefinitely long period of time. This, I believe, is the basic flaw in the gravitational theory
of Penrose [1] and in the spontaneous reduction theory of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [2].
Their ‘timing’ is off. Macroscopic states dont always collapse as soon as they are created.
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no-capture collapse can occur without prematurely abandoning the possibility of
a capture. Therefore, a collapse to ψ(t)D0 can only occur when the interaction
is complete; that is, assuming that the state is not first collapsed by rule (A) or
by the intervention of an observer.
Rule (B): If the superposition ψ(t)D0 + D1(t) survives to the end of an
interaction, then it will collapse to the current contributing component ψ(t)D0,
making it the sole survivor.
Rule (B) follows from the necessity to preserve rule (A). However, there are
consequences that make this rule untenable. For simplicity, suppose that the
approaching particle has a total probability of capture equal to 60%. Let an
observer look at the detector before the interaction is complete - at a time when
there is only a 50% probability of capture. Rule (A) then requires that the
observer find the detector in its capture state 50% of the time; and otherwise,
rule (B) requires that the observer find the superposition of eq. 1 since the
interaction is not yet over. The observer is therefore exposed to a strange
combination of pre-quantum and quantum states, consisting of D1 plus the
superposition in eq. 1. This will lead to the following observational absurdity.
The state of the system is listed on the left in fig. 1 and the corresponding
experience of the observer (following the Born interpretation) is listed on the
right. From the first row, the observer will find the detector in the state D1 a
full 50% of the time. From the second row, D1 will be observed half of 50% of
the time because of the Born rule applied to the superposition, and D0 will be
observed for the other half of that time. All together, D1 will be observed 75%
of the time, andD0 will be observed 25% of the time. Our initial assumption was
that the particle is captured 50% of the time (up to the time of the observation),
so there is something absurdly wrong with this result?
Rule (A) is surely correct if the Hamiltonian is to be believed. Because of
that, a no-capture collapse is unavoidably delayed until the interaction is termi-
with probabilities 0.5 and 0.5
D1D1
State at time of observation
50% of the time
D0 half of 50% of the time
D1 half of 50% of the time
Observer sees
ψ(t)D  + D0 1
capture 50%
no capture 50%
Figure 1
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nated is some way, and this sets up the absurd result in fig. 1. The conundrum
posed here is more fundamental than any possible ‘theory’ of measurement.
It has to do with the difficulty in finding a straightforward empirical formula
(i.e., a set of rules A and B) that accurately portrays the ‘timing’ of the two
possible reductions. Since rules of this kind should apply generally to any inter-
action, their failure to apply in this situation suggests that absurdity will follow
whenever objective state reduction is allowed to compete with the reduction
associated with an observer.
The above argument shows that observer state reduction cannot compete
with objective state reduction in this interaction. Since an observation (re-
sulting in reduction) can surely be arranged, it is strongly suggested that an
objective reduction will not occur in this or in any similar situation. More gen-
erally, it is suggested that there is no such thing as an objective measurement.
Quantum mechanics doesn’t need objective measurement, there is no empirical
or presently existing theoretical reason for it, so Occam’s razor seems to require
that we reject the idea. It may only be a remnant of classical thinking.
Rules Governing Observer Reduction (Observer
Measurement)
On the other hand, it is possible to discover consistent and well-behaved rules
that describe observer reductions alone. This has been done in a previous
publication [3]. These exclusively observer-based rules make it possible to
include the observer in a quantum mechanical system, and they place novel
macro-theoretical constraints on participating brain states.
Standard quantum mechanics with the Born interpretation does not allow
the observer to be included in the system. It allows an observer to look at the
system at one particular time, but it does not let him follow further develop-
ments in a continuous way. He can come back later and see what has happened,
but he cannot stay and become part of the system. This limitation on the
observer is overcome by the proposed observer-based rules [4].
There are five of these rules in ref. 3, the first four of which give a consistent
and accurate empirical description of observation measurement. The first of
these replaces the Born rule. It replaces the static notion of probability with
the dynamic notion of probability/time. It is this, together with the other rules,
that allows the expansion of quantum mechanics to include conscious observers
on a continuing basis.
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In addition, these rules make novel synthetic statements about brains. Two
of the rules are selection rules that limit the transitions that can take place
between those brain states that are the basis states of state reduction. As such,
the rules place significant macro-theoretical constrains on the brains of conscious
observers.
The proposed rules in ref. 3 are successfully applied to a number of different
situations, including two different versions of the Schro¨dinger cat experiment.
I believe they are generalizable to any interaction that includes an observer.
Therefore, they are the empirical guidelines that must be met by any theory
that claims to explain observer based state reduction in quantum mechanics,
whether or not objective reduction is also validated.
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